Last Friday, May 11, a special committee in the Upper House approved a bill establishing rules under which Japan would hold the national referendum necessary in order to enact any reforms to the nation’s Constitution. The full Upper House then promptly voted to pass the bill into law on Monday of this week. As it has now passed both houses of the Diet and become law, the constitutional reform bill is set to become a large feather in the cap of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has been pressing hard for a law setting the rules for making amendments to Japan’s Constitution since taking office in September of last year.

Although opposition parties expressed a desire to debate the bill further, and to hold public hearings on its contents, this was skipped over because the LDP had enough of a majority in the Upper House to declare that sufficient debate on the bill had already taken place in the Diet. Thus, demands from opposition parties that a minimum voter turnout be necessary in order for a national referendum to be valid were tossed aside, and the LDP was able to exercise, and demonstrate, its Parliamentary strength in moving this piece of legislature through both houses of the Diet in relatively quick measure.

It now seems as though the prospect of constitutional reform in Japan is very real indeed, though the exact shape that such reform will manifest as is still very much unclear. It will take a period of three years or so to draft amendments (though some preliminary drafts already exist), debate them, revise them and bring them to a vote in the Diet, but the legal framework to then bring those amendments to a vote in the Diet, and if approved, to a national referendum, now exists.

With Upper House elections coming up in July, does the Prime Minster have any political capital left to mine on the constitutional reform issue? It seems as though he does:

On Friday of last week, Abe told the special committee in the Upper House:

We have entered a period when we can discuss what a new Constitution should be like. I am thinking about constitutional revision based on the (LDP) draft. I will state that case to the public during the elections.

This is not the first time that Abe has said that he will make the case for constitutional reform as part of the campaign for July’s election. However, before it appeared certain that the bill would pass, it seemed as though the Prime Minister could have been bluffing: By threatening to make an election issue of constitutional reform, could he force the opposition parties to get on board and approve the bill? Could they (and the Democratic Party of Japan in particular) stand the heat of having to campaign against the LDP on this issue?

With the bill’s approval by the Upper House, Mr Abe now has the first part of what he wants: the cornerstone for constitutional reform. The bill’s passage was about ten days to two weeks later than he would have liked, but that really is not too far off schedule.

Mr Abe’s comments last Friday, however, hint that he is still planning to make constitutional reform an issue in the upcoming election. Statements made this week indicate that the Prime Minister is still of this line of thinking. What effect could this have on both the DPJ and the LDP’s coalition partner, New Komeito?

On April 28, a panel of LDP, DPJ, and New Kometio Diet members and policy makers spoke at the National Press Club in Tokyo. During the course of the proceedings, this interesting exchange ensued:

Yukio Edano (Chairman, DPJ constitutional Research Commission):

The blame for the situation surrounding the national referendum bill should fall on Prime Minister Abe and DPJ president Ozawa. The Prime Minister’s remark that he intends to make revising the Constitution an issue in the Upper House election campaign will certainly be troublesome for us. If we have to cross swords with people vowing to keep the Constitution unaltered, the LDP and DPJ must cooperate in the election. However, if constitutional reform is made an issue in the campaign, the DPJ will have to highlight how it differs from the ruling parties.

Hajime Funada (LDP - Director, Lower House Special Committee for constitutional Research):

It was natural for the LDP President to say that he wants to revise the Constitution. However, for him to say that the party will make it a campaign issue in the Upper House election went a bit too far. He later revised his remarks, and I hope you will accept that.

Masao Akamatsu (Chairman, New Komeito constitutional Research Commission):

As a member of the coalition partner, I’ve been a little troubled by the [Prime Minister’s] remarks. Each time the Prime Minister has made such comments, [New Komeito] Chief Representative [Akihiro] Ota told him, “Please be careful with what you say.” However, I feel the Prime Minister has not paid much attention.

This is not a trifling issue. Let’s remember that when the Prime Minister speaks of constitutional reform, foremost in his mind is Article Nine of the Constitution, which states:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

Article Nine is short, but to the point. The Prime Minister, and others, want to see it updated to reflect the geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century. In this observer’s opinion, the existence of the Self-Defense Forces (since 1954) and the fact that Japan ranks third amongst the nations in terms of annual defense expenditures renders Article Nine outdated. Article Nine is overdue for reform, although the language of such an amendment is certain to be controversial. Certainly, such a debate is better left for another time.

What interests us now is that the Prime Minister seems bent on making constitutional reform, and by extension, reform of Article Nine, a campaign issue at this time. Coalition partner New Komeito remains steadfastly opposed to any such revision of Article Nine, which seems certain to put them in an uncomfortable position should the LDP push hard for it as a campaign issue.

What would the LDP gain by pushing constitutional reform in the leadup to the election? Let’s look at the numbers in the Upper House:

Liberal Democratic Party: 109
Democratic Party of Japan-Shin-Ryokufukai coalition: 83
New Komeito: 24
Japan Communist Party: 9
Social Democratic Party-Goken Rengo: 6
People’s New Party: 4
Independent: 5
Vacant: 2

Out of 242 total seats, the LDP/New Komeito coalition holds 133, eleven more than are needed to secure a majority. In addition, there are independent members who are sympathetic to the LDP. Over in the Lower House, with 306 of 480 seats, the LDP already has a majority secured, and thus does not actually need the coalition with New Komeito in order to secure a simple majority on votes. However, it is very unlikely that the LDP could post large enough gains to hold a majority in the Upper House by itself after the July election. Thus, we assume that a coalition with New Komeito will most likely remain politically necessary for the LDP for at least the next few years.

New Komeito, on the other hand, would essentially be insignificant to national politics if it were not the LDP’s junior coalition member. It holds 31 out of 480 seats in the Lower House, and 24 out of 242 in the Upper House. New Komeito’s position on Article Nine is that the two existing paragraphs should remain unchanged, but that a third paragraph could be added in order to clarify exactly what is meant by the existing two. New Komeito opposes the idea of collective self-defense, but believes that in certain cases it may be (wrongly) justified by the Constitution in its existing state. Thus, unlike the LDP, New Komeito would like to see a tightening of the restrictions set in place by Article Nine.

This position places New Komeito directly at odds with the LDP, their more powerful coalition partner. Perhaps strangely, New Komeito’s position is more in line with the policies of the Social Democratic Party and Communist Party of Japan, which naturally wish to see no LDP-led constitutional revision whatsoever, but especially with regard to Article Nine.

How will the LDP and New Komeito resolve their differences over this issue? If the LDP were powerful enough to gain a single-party majority in the Upper House, this observer feels that the LDP would pay much less attention and expend far less energy on maintaining their sometimes tenuous coalition with New Komeito; certainly we would see fewer legislative compromises made with the sole intent of keeping New Komeito satiated. At the same time, the LDP is keenly aware that in order to pass any proposed constitutional reform bills in the future, it will need a two-thirds vote in both houses. A simple majority will not cut it, and an unhappy coalition partner might be fully willing to play hardball with the LDP and hold out for a compromise that works to its benefit. At the same time, should the LDP/New Komeito coalition hold less than two-thirds of the seats in either house, their games may be rendered irrelevant by the fact that passage of any reform bill may prove mathematically impossible so long as the other opposition parties hold together.

Until now, there has been little talk, aside from a few isolated rumors, of a split in the LDP/New Komeito coalition, despite a few muted whispers earlier this week. However, should Mr Abe press forward with constitutional reform as a campaign issue, the relationship could well begin to show signs of stress. The public might also be left wondering why the coalition should stand at all, given that the two parties clearly disagree on what is likely to become the issue that defines Japan’s political landscape over the next few years.

With that danger on the horizon, why would Mr Abe highlight constitutional reform as a campaign issue, especially when no actual amendments to the Constitution will be brought to a vote in the Diet before 2010? Mr Abe has two potentially strong reasons for campaigning on this issue, especially where the LDP faces a tight race against a DPJ opponent. First, the Prime Minister needs to start selling his idea of constitutional reform to the public immediately. Much of the public, although eager to amend the Constitution to ensure that certain rights are put in place, is nervous about making alterations about Article Nine. Victory for Abe in a national referendum is not guaranteed, and he needs to take every available opportunity to present his views to the public at times when party members are likely to be the most unified in terms of platform; the campaign period before an Upper House election is a perfect example of one such time.

The more that Abe talks about constitutional reform, the more people will get used to the idea, and if he is successful, enough resistance to it will melt away as members of the voting public either come around to the Prime Minister’s point of view, or else give up their opposition in the belief that his vision of reform is inevitable.

The second reason why constitutional reform may be an expedient campaign issue for Mr Abe is that talking about it will allow him to force the DPJ into an awkward position, as Mr Edano expressed at the discussion on April 28. Many of their members do support constitutional reform of some sort, although obviously not exactly of the type Mr Abe wants. However, if making changes to the Constitution becomes a campaign issue, DPJ candidates will be forced to differentiate their positions from those of Mr Abe, and, by proxy, the LDP. This is a waste of valuable time for the DPJ, who currently has no coherent, unified stance on constitutional reform and would experience much greater benefit from discussing other issues in the campaign period.

In some sense, Mr Abe has borrowed a page from the Koizumi ‘postal reform’ playbook: run on an issue that the other side can’t possibly oppose - whether in terms of policy or ideology. The DPJ clearly cannot stand opposed to the broad idea of constitutional reform, and without a clear vision to communicate to the public, it will be difficult for their candidates to discuss its nuts and bolts while seeming convincing in the face of being hammered over the head with Mr Abe’s mantra of “Building of Beautiful Country, Japan.”

Thus, we are left with the question of where would this leave New Komeito? This observer does not have a clear theory on that just yet, but assumes that Mr Abe is not about to let a junior opposition party get in the way of what he sees as establishing his legacy. The LDP may flex its muscles and tell New Komeito to get on board (perhaps with some concessions), or else say, “Thanks for the memories.” Can New Komeito afford to risk the breakup? Without their status as LDP coalition partner, how long would it take for them to fade from the national political scene? Or, perhaps even more provokingly, could they find a new coalition partner?

It may be too early for such speculation. After the Upper House election plays out, we will see where the LDP stands and whether or not it will continue to feel the need to toss the occasional policy bone to its junior partner. Until then, one thing is for certain: Expect to hear a lot more about constitutional reform over the next two months.

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