FDR Issues US Declaration of War on Japan following Pearl Harbor Attack

Filed under: Sonota, Trans-Pacific Radio, Rekishi - History
Posted by Garrett DeOrio at 8:10 am on Thursday, December 6, 2007

December 7, 2007

On this day in 1941, the Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor.

Last year, TPR brought you this brief summary of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the US’s entry into World War II.

This year, we bring you the speech itself.
Listen to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt explain America’s declaration of war.

What is striking is how much happened on December 7th and 8th, 1941, and how little of it is remembered now - how many major events have been pushed aside as Pearl Harbor went from surprise to symbol to legend (to schmaltzy film.)

On December 8, 1941 (Japan time), Japan not only attacked Pearl Harbor. . .

but was in the midst of an explosive expansion on a number of fronts, making big moves throughout the Pacific, which shows a clear plan to escalate the war and, presumably, win by catching its enemies unaware.

. . . American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

Yesterday, the Japanese government also launched an attack against Malaya. Last night, Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong. Last night, Japanese forces attacked Guam. Last night, Japanese forces attacked the Phillippine Islands. Last night, the Japanese attacked Wake Island. And this morning, the Japanese attacked Midway Island.

What’s interesting about FDR’s speech is the formality with which war was declared, the audible popularity of the man, the unity of the chamber. The contrasts between the last time the United States declared war and the way in which the US has entered pretty much every military engagement it has had since are so striking that they need no further comment.

Aside from this, the way he spoke about Japan caught my attention. Here he was, declaring war, decrying a dastardly attack, but he still referred to the “Empire of Japan.” No cute, puerile insults, no impulse to automatically ascribe any foul name he could to the enemies of the United States, no insistence on doing his utmost to strike fear in the hearts of the American people. FDR was, well, presidential.

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Comment by Ken Worsley

December 6, 2007 @ 1:57 pm

The contrasts between the last time the United States declared war and the way in which the US has entered pretty much every military engagement it has had since are so striking that they need no further comment.

Actually, what struck me was the similarity to Bush’s address to the joint session of congress after 9/11. Bush tried to channel this moment, and managed to lose his high ground within 2 years. FDR’s can be questioned, but has survived much more intact.

Comment by DeOrio

December 6, 2007 @ 2:05 pm

What I found so striking was that FDR laid out a litany of things that had clearly been done, attributed them to the actual perpetrators, and formally declared war on a definable enemy - all without drumming up fear or engaging in hyperbole.

Bush tried to channel this moment, and could have, but failed immediately - largely because Pearl Harbor was a terrible analogy for 9/11. Bush’s stance was vague, political, and fearmongering from the outset.

Comment by Turner

December 7, 2007 @ 9:09 pm

No denying that, but it’s a completely different world now - different politics, different threats; in addition, FDR probably couldn’t have foreseen a future where the US could go to war multiple times without declaring war.

Comment by Garrett DeOrio

December 8, 2007 @ 1:13 am

True enough, but Bush knew all about how to actually go to war and surely someone in the White House figured out that “terror” is not an actual enemy you can fight, so declaring an undeclared war against terror is pointless.

Comment by Ken Worsley

December 8, 2007 @ 8:36 pm

The lesson from the War on Drugs was invaluable in establishing the war on terror: Set up an enemy that really can’t be defined other than by those who call the shots, and smear all who raise questions about whether or not the policy is correct by rigging the debate.

Comment by Garrett DeOrio

December 10, 2007 @ 12:06 pm

Well said. None of the great futurist or Sci-Fi writers, with their wars against nonexistent entities, foresaw what would really happen, which is much better for propaganda purposes: War on Abstract Nouns ascribed to whatever corporeal enemy you’re facing at the moment, thereby obviating the need to pretend Eurasia or Eastasia was never at war with Oceania. It’s all the same war, different incarnations of the vaguely defined abstract ideas against which we so valiantly fight.

If LBJ were president today, he’d be taking on poverty with missiles and refusing to back down in the face of poor people intent on spreading poverty.

Comment by Matt Dioguardi

December 11, 2007 @ 5:33 am

Here is something I have always wanted to look into but still haven’t taken the time.

There was a policy in place in America against Japan prior to the war, embargoes and so on.

In light of what happened, should we regard those policies as good or bad?

I have never seriously attempted to study this issue, but it is something I think about a lot.

Comment by Garrett DeOrio

December 11, 2007 @ 9:22 am

Good question, Matt. I guess a judgement of the partial blockades, embargoes, etc. would have to be based on whether we view those policies as mere reactions to Japan’s actions (i.e., the US could no longer, morally, sell oil to Japan after it had begun invading and colonizing its neighbors, nor could the US, in good conscience, allow supplies vital to these actions to pass unhindered through or near Phillippine waters), proximate causes of the War, or direct causes.

I tend to think the direct cause argument is least persuasive, only because that makes it seem as if the whole Pacific War (in so far as the US was involved) could have been avoided had the US simply allowed Japanese shipping to go on unhindered. On the other hand, the reaction argument makes it seem as if American policies and actions in the region played no role in provoking Japan into the attack on Pearl Harbor or engaging in hostilities with the US in general.

I’d say American policies put in place as the Pacific War escalated, prior to American involvement, served to accelerate what probably would have happened anyway. Any time a colonial power, especially a new one, expands rapidly, it’s going to threaten the interests of other colonial powers in the region as well as the local governments of the region, which is going to provoke hostilities.

Had the US left the Phillippines and retreated back as far as Hawaii, it might have been able to avoid war with Japan, but might very well have found itself in a standoff in the Pacific for decades.

Comment by Matt Dioguardi

December 11, 2007 @ 3:59 pm

Garrett,

Those are thoughtful comments thanks.

It’s interesting you mention the Philippines, because at one point in history there was a strong movement for America not to colonize the Philippines. Among those in protest was Mark Twain, and I’m sure some other famous names as well.

At some point I want to really go back and study American policy in the Pacific and contemplate alternative histories that might have been. Until then …

Comment by Garrett DeOrio

December 11, 2007 @ 5:12 pm

Hear, hear! I’d love to do the same. Tell you what, when you do it, write one of those “What If. . .?” books, so I can read it. You write better than I do anyway.

At this point, having not done the research I’d like to, I can say the only direct link I see is a line from the US colonization of the Philippines to the US’s being in a position to impose a devastating embargo on Japan, when Japan decided to ally itself with Germany in 1940, to Japan’s decision to attack Pearl Harbor and make its big push in SE Asia when it did.

The trouble, from an historical viewpoint, is that I cannot say that the same wouldn’t have happened a bit later had the US embargo been less effective or more difficult to enforce. I can’t imagine a scenario in which Japanese and American aims would not have collided, especially given the US’s de facto alliance with the UK, the American rhetorical support for France, and the interests those Western powers had in East Asia, especially SE Asia.

It had never occurred to me in so many words before, but I suppose the US had to fight Japan if it was going to fight Germany and Japan had to make a pact with Germany if it was going to pursue its aims in the region. All of this, of course, is because of the aforementioned British, French, and Dutch interests.

And now, just like that, WWII is looking, to me, a lot more similar to WWI than it ever had before.

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